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The aim of this study is to examine the bank-specific and macroeconomic determi-
nants of banks profitability operating in Western and Eastern Europe over the time
period from 2005 to 2012. The bank profitability in our model is measured by the
return on average assets (ROAA) and the interest rate margin (NIM) as a function of
bank-specific and macroeconomic determinants. Using an unbalanced panel dataset
of 1324 commercial banks, public listed and unlisted, we evaluate the impact of the
recent financial crisis, separating the sample in two sub samples. We separately con-
sider the pre-crisis period, 2005 to 2008, and the post-crisis years, 2009 to 2012. We
examine the impact of bank-specific and macroeconomic factors, some of which have
not been considered in previous studies. These new entries as well as the separation
of the sample allow us to gain new knowledge into what determines the profitability
of commercial banks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The European banking sector has experienced a number of remarkable structural
changes over the last decade. Structural and conduct deregulation which were caused
mainly by modifications occurred in the external environment, especially as a result
of the increasing monetary and financial integration, has brought banks to compete
in previously inaccessible domestic and foreign markets. Gradual liberalization of
capital flows, along with developments and technological advantages have generated
the potential for economies of scale and scope. At the same time the proliferation
of foreign banks have intensified competition, resulting in reduced profit margins in
many European national banking sectors. To respond to those pressures banks have
introduced new strategies aiming to improve efficiency. Through mergers and acquisi-
tion activity banks have realized the potential of scale and scope economies and have
reduced labour and other costs that affect profitability. Many financial institutions
have also designed strategies of diversification and financial innovation, introduc-
ing a wider range of products, services and new sophisticated financial instruments
(Goddard et al., 2001).
This wave of change in the European banking market appeared after the enlarge-
ment of the European Union to include countries from Central, East, and South
Europe, most of which were undergoing significant economic and political trans-
formation. Eight East European countries (Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland) and two Mediterranean coun-
tries Malta and Cyprus entered the union in 2004, and one additional Eastern coun-
try from the Balkans (Bulgaria) joined the group in 2007. These entries produced
important challenges to the European banking system, increasing the level of compe-
tition between the member states, and initiating a procedure of financial integration.
The establishment of a strong banking system in the new EU member states has
been a fundamental aspect of this integration procedure. Most of these states had
to modernize their underdeveloped financial systems, shifting to a two-tier banking
1
Chapter 1. Introduction 2
system, with the Central European Bank ensuring macroeconomic stability. Dur-
ing this transition period, the focus has been on the improvement of the regulatory
banking environment, and on the reinforcement and restructuring of financial ser-
vices. Such changes are necessary to equip the new members against any future
financial and market fluctuations and to maintain economic stability and growth.
While much progress has been made to this direction, the financial structure of the
new EU countries still poses a number of distinctive features compared to the old
member states, including a high level of foreign involvement in most financial sec-
tors and a relatively low degree of financial intermediation (Staikouras, Mamatzakis,
and Koutsomanoli-Filippaki, 2008). Moreover, the banking environment before and
after the financial crisis have embraced significant changes. In fact, this milestone
influenced significanlty the stability of the banking industry and the entire economy,
while it changed the mechanisms that determine bank profitability. These features
make the performance of the banking sectors of those countries interesting to study.
To our knowledge, few papers in the extensive literature on bank profitability have as-
sessed whether the financial crisis has changed the relationship of profitability with its
determinants, and none of these papers include Eastern European countries in their
sample. The study by Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011), studying one country, eval-
uated the impact of the recent financial crisis on the profitability of 372 commercial
banks in Switzerland over the period from 1999 to 2009. Their result outlined that
financial crisis influenced significantly the Swiss banking sector and specifically bank
profitability. Our study aims to this gap by examining a specific region of the EU. In
particular, this study seeks to measure the effects of bank-specific, macroeconomic,
market structure and regulatory factors on two fundamental profitability measures
in the banking sector of Eastern and Western Europe over the period 2005-2012. It
also tests whether the impact of these determinants significantly differs between the
periods before and after the financial crisis.
We measure profitability by the return on average assets and by interest margins.
Assuming that in the developing banking systems the variation of the return on aver-
age assets and the net interest margin are moving factors of profit volatility, research
on those two determinants conveys significant information for the establishment of
effective banking policies and cost efficiency strategies. This is especially the case
when the economic and financial environment is unstable, like the recent financial
crisis. The return on average assets reflects how efficient management is managing
the company’s total assets to gain profit. The higher the levels of return on average
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assets, the more efficient management is in utilizing its asset base. On the other hand,
a high level of interest rate margins generally indicates inefficiency, excessive risk or
lack of competition. However, high margins may also suggest safety and stability in
the banking sector.
Athanasoglou, Delis, and Staikouras (2006) were the first to examine the determi-
nants of banks profitability in seven Southern Eastern European countries over the
period 1998-2002. Measuring profitability as the return on assets and return on eq-
uity, they investigated how this is affected by internal and external factors namely, the
bank financial reform process that took place before the accession of the countries to
the EU, and the macroeconomic environment. Briefly, these authors concluded that
South Eastern countries require an efficient banking system in order to cover private
and public funding requirements. Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008) examined the
bank determinants of interest margins operating in 31 Western and Eastern European
countries over the period 1994-2001. By comparing Central and Eastern European
banks with Western European banks, they asked to what extent the relatively high
bank margins in eastern countries can cause low efficiency or non-competitive market
conditions, taking into consideration the influence of foreign and state-owned banks
and the macroeconomic environment. Their main results concluded that capital con-
stitutes an important factor of interest margins and that straightly policy actions are
required in the non-accession countries. Finally, Brissimis, Delis, and Papanikolaou
(2008) developed an empirical model of bank performance applied to banks in ten
newly acceded EU countries. Their research shows a relationship between the reform
of the banking sector and bank performance in terms of efficiency, net interest margin
and increased productivity.
Compared to the aforementioned studies, we investigate if profitability is explained
by a wide range of factors. Specifically, we consider five factor categories: capital
adequacy, capital strength, operations, liquidity and macroeconomic indicators. We
also compare how the effect of these factors differs before and after the financial
crisis using a sample of both Eastern and Western European countries. We find that
loan loss provisions have significantly increased after the financial crisis and this is
reflected in its negative impact on profitability during the crisis years. Also capital
ratio shows a high figure before the financial crisis, denoting that their profitability
was higher comparing to the period after the crisis.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 reviews past and
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recent literature on bank profitability, especially in the euro area banking sector. This
review serves to summarize the hypothesis posed by the literature on the determinants
of bank profitability and the expected direction of their effect. Chapter 3 introduces
the data; it presents descriptive statistics; provides the methodology; and outlines
the model formulation. The empirical results are presented in Chapter 4. Finally,
Chapter 5 gives some concluding remarks, notes the limitations of our study and
discusses future research potentials on the topic.
Chapter 2
Theoritical background
This section reviews relevant literature on factors that influence banking profitability.
Although a number of researches have examined bank profitability and bank efficiency
(Miller and Noulas, 1997;Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001;Albertazzi and Gamba-
corta, 2009;Abdennour and Khediri, 2010;Goddard et al., 2004;Bolt et al., 2012), this
study focuses specifically on the investigation of potential determinants of Western
and Easter European banks’ profitability.
2.1 Literature on the determinants of bank profitability
An extensive literature in banking and finance defines, bank profitability as a function
of the return on average assets (ROAA) and the return on average equity (ROAE).
This literature poses that bank performance is driven by a number of internal and
external determinants. Determinants that are considered as internal are factors that
are mostly influenced by decision of management and policy objectives (Staikouras
and Wood, 2004), such as capital adequacy, cost management, the size of the bank,
provisioning policies and liquidity levels. In his study, Zimmerman (1996) showed
that management decisions were important factor in the performance of a bank, in-
fluencing specifically the loan portfolio concentration. Early studies by Short (1979)
and Bourke (1989) have also attempted to identify major factors of banks’ prof-
itability, providing evidence that high concentration and great market power lead to
higher profitability. More specifically, the first resulted that high market power leads
to higher profitability and the latter to a positive relation between capital ratios,
liquidity ratios, interest rates and profitability. Some studies consider internal and
external determinants by studying a single country (e.g., Berger, 1995b;Kosmidou
et al., 2006;Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011;Alper and Anbar, 2011), others conduct
their analysis on a group of countries (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; Staikouras and
5
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Wood, 2004;Goddard et al., 2004). One of the first studies that examines bank prof-
itability in several countries is the study by Molyneux and Thornton (1992) which
shows a positive association between the return on equity and the level of inter-
est rates, bank concentration and government ownership. Maudos and Fernandez
De Guevara (2004), in their recent study find that loan to assets and equity to assets
ratios have a positive impact on interest margins and profitability. They also indi-
cate that operating costs have a positive impact on net interest margins measures
but not on profits measures. The opposite holds for a bank’s market share. Further,
computations on balance sheet and income statement ratios for banks of FED have
shown that capital ratios, interest paid and received, salaries and wages are signifi-
cantly related to profitability. Emphasis also, should be given in cost management,
fund source and funds use management in order to improve management efficiency
(Staikouras and Wood, 2004). The performance of banks is also affected by changes
in credit risk which reflect in the health of a bank’s loan portfolio. Because increased
exposure to credit risk is associated with decreased firm profitability, Athanasoglou,
Delis, and Staikouras (2006) and Duca and McLaughlin (1990) conclude that fluctu-
ations in bank profitability are largely associated to variations in credit risk. In the
same vein, as noted by Miller and Noulas (1997), the quality of the loan portfolio
in the real estate loan market have a negative effect on large financial institution
profitability.
Concerning leverage, its impact on the banking industry is ambiguous. Because lower
capital ratios indicate a relatively risky position for a given bank one expects a neg-
ative association between leverage and profitability(Berger, 1995b). However, the
study by Athanasoglou, Delis, and Staikouras (2006) states that, under some cir-
cumstances, higher levels of equity would increase the cost of capital, influencing the
profitability positively. Actually, most studies that work on the use of capital ratios
as an explanatory factor of bank profitability, compound to a positive relationship.
Bank size is also identified as a variable that controls cost differences, product and
risk diversification. Generally, analysts use bank size to spot potential economies of
scale in the banking sector. According to Bourke (1989) and Athanasoglou, Delis, and
Staikouras (2006), cost control differences lead to a positive relationship between size
and bank profitability, if significant economies of scale exist. In their paper, Berger
et al. (1987), Athanasoglou, Delis, and Staikouras (2006) however, argue that few
cost savings can be realized by accruing the size of the bank, specifically as market
develops. Other researchers, like Eichengreen and Gibson (2001), suggest that size
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of a bank after a certain limit could be unfavorable due to bureaucracy and affect
negatively the relation between size and profitability.
Some studies state that expense control is the major determinant of bank profitability,
since reduced expenses improve the efficiency and hence increase the profitability of
the bank (Bourke, 1989). When large size and large differences exists in salaries and
wages, then the efficient use of labor is a key determinant of relative profitability.
As conventional wisdom suggests, staff expenses is expected to be inversely related
to profitability. The reason for this relation is that these costs reduce the total
operation of the bank. In the study of Bourke (1989) the level of staff expenses has a
negative impact on banks’ ROA. However, in the study of Athanasoglou et al. (2008)
the relationship between staff expenses and total profits is positive. These authors
suggest that high profits earned by firms in a regulated industry may be appropriated
in the form of higher payroll expenditures. In any case, it should be interesting to
investigate and identify the dominant effect in an environment like one of the the
Western - Eastern European region.
Moreover, literature investigates the relation between liquidity and profitability. The
inability of a bank to serve decreases in liabilities or to fund asset growth leads to
liquidity risk (Athanasoglou et al., 2006). Therefore, liquidity risk is considered as an
important factor of bank profitability. According to Bourke (1989) there is a positive
relationship between liquidity and profitability.
External determinants of profitability, both industry-related and macroeconomic, are
factors that are mainly influenced by the economic and legal environment where bank
institutions operate. Researchers often investigate the impact of external determi-
nants on bank performance separately from other factors to isolate their influence
from that of bank structure. For example, Staikouras and Wood (2004) focus on the
effect of real GDP. They point out that the behavior of real GDP does not explain the
greater variability of banking sector profits in the UK than in Germany. However, it
is no clear that the GDP variability did not affect profits. Another external determi-
nant that can be important and undermines the stability of the financial system is
inflation. Revell (1979) introduced the issue indicating that the influence of inflation
depends on whether operating costs and wages increase faster than inflation. They
concluded that variations in bank profitability can be explained significantly by the
level of inflation. The study by Athanasoglou, Delis, and Staikouras (2006) notes the
importance of an economy to accurately forecast the future inflation rate and, thus,
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of banks to respectively manage and adjust their operating costs. When unexpected
rises of inflation happen, this can cause cash flow shortage for borrowers which can
lead to premature termination of loan contracts and loan losses. Furthermore, in-
flation is considered as the main route through which the operations and margins
of financial institutions are affected by interest rates. Staikouras and Wood (2004)
mention that high and fluctuant inflation has significant impact on bank earnings.
Firstly, generates difficulties in the assessment of loan decisions, since a loan agree-
ment which is implemented at the anticipated rate of inflation may turn out to be
more marginal if inflation is unforeseen low and realized interest rates thus unfore-
seen high. This uncertainty about future inflation levels may provoke problems in
planning and in agreement negotiation on loans. In high and variable inflation situ-
ations, banks are encouraged to finance investments in property markets, a strategy
and decision which may lead to market losses or high profitability according to the
performing monetary policy. Also relevant to bank profitability are the reserves that
countries maintain to absorb any sudden stop in capital flows (Jeanne and Rancie`re,
2006). This factor could be considered important as it shows the required reserves,
a regulation of the central bank. These reserves are normally in the form of cash
stored physically in a bank vault or deposits. The required reserve ratio is often used
as a tool in monetary policy, influencing the country’s borrowing and interest rates
by changing the amount of funds available for banks to issue loans. The alteration of
the reserves can influence the liquidity of banks and therefore affect positively their
profitability.
2.2 Determinants of bank profitability and variable selection
Studies that examine the determinants of profitability typically define profitability as
the return on bank assets and equity, and the net interest margin. More recent stud-
ies have proposed a number of other definitions, such as EVA(economic value added)
and RAROC (risk-adjusted return on capital) (ECB, 2010). We follow the literature
and take as the main measure of profitability (and as the main dependent variable of
study), the return on average assets (ROAA), which we calculate as the profit before
taxes divided by total assets. As an alternative profitability measure we also use the
net interest margin (NIM), which is the net interest income expressed as a percentage
of earning assets. The higher this figure, the cheaper the funding or the higher the
margin the bank is commanding (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). Higher margins
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and profitability are desirable as long as the asset quality is being maintained. Both
variables have been used in many studies on bank performance. The elements that
distinguish them is that ROAA measures the profit earned per dollar of assets and re-
flects how well bank management uses bank’s investment resources, while net interest
margin limelight on profits earned on interest activities. Concerning the potential de-
terminants of bank profitability, the literature suggests several factors. These factors
can be distinguished into ownership-specific and location-specific,as customary in the
multinational banking literature, or into bank-specific (internal) and market-related
(external), as customary in the empirical studies that focus on the profitability of
domestic banks. So far, research on the relative importance of such factors has not
been exhaustive. For example, only a few papers have performed an analysis of the
impacts of the recent financial crisis on the determinants of profitability (Dietrich
and Wanzenried, 2011;Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). As we discuss in the
introduction, in this paper we advance the literature by exploring the determinants
of profitability before and after the financial crisis. In what follows, we discuss the
set of potential determinants, we include in our analysis (i.e. our set of independent
variables). In Table 2.1, we provide a brief description of each variable and indicate
the direction of its expected impact on profitability.
2.2.1 Internal determinants
The internal bank-specific determinants that we analyse in this study are taken from
the asset quality, capital strength, cost management, liquidity and size categories of
information available in the profitability accounts of the banks. From the asset qual-
ity category we select the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans (LLGR). This ratio
expresses the reserve of losses as percentage of loans and is used as a proxy of quality
and credit portfolio. Several hypotheses, like those of ‘bad management’ and ‘bad
luck’ , focus on this relationship between operating expenses and credit quality. The
former hypothesis states that credit quality is endogenous to the quality of bank man-
agement and the underperformance of bank managers. The latter hypothesis poses
that an exogenous increase in non-performing loans would lead even the most efficient
banks to pick additional inputs necessary to balance problematic credits (Staikouras
et al., 2008). A third hypothesis, the so-called risk-return hypothesis poses a positive
relationship between risk and profits (Kosmidou, 2008). These hypotheses aside, the
loan loss reserves to gross loans (LLGR) ratio presents useful information to analysts
and investors because it indicates how strong a bank’s lending base is. A poor asset
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quality (i.e. high value of LLGR) is expected to negatively influence bank profitabil-
ity. Another potentially important determinant from the asset quality category is
the loan loss provision to net interest revenue (LOSSPROV). This ratio indicates
the relationship between provisions in the profit and loss account and the interest
income over the same period. A bank with high risk tolerance might serve doubtful
customers at higher interest rates, or invest in products that will inflate profits in the
short-term. If these customers default on their lending liabilities, such policies will
have a negative impact on banks’ profitability (Kosmidou et al., 2007). Under ideal
circumstances LOSSPROV should be as low as possible. In a well operating bank if
the lending book is high risk this should be mirrored by the higher interest margins.
However, when LOSSPROV deteriorates the risk is not being properly rendered by
margins.
In terms of operation the cost to income ratio (CTI) measures the impact of effi-
ciency in cost management on bank performance. Specifically, this ratio measures
the overheads/costs of governing the bank (the primarily element of which is employee
salaries and benefits) as percentage of income. One typically expects this ratio to be
negatively related to bank performance. However, this may not always be the case
because higher amounts of expenses may be related with a higher volume of bank-
ing activities and consequently higher amount of revenues. Another bank-specific
determinant which we draw from operations category is the return on average equity
(ROAE). The return on equity is a measure of the return of shareholder funds. It
is obvious that the greater this ratio is the better of the banks’ performance. How-
ever, a notable limitation of ROAE is that it captures the health of institutions in
the short-term without considering the bank’s long-term strategy or the long-term
damages induced by financial crises (ECB, 2010). In fact, in their study, Molyneux
and Thornton (1992) found a positive relationship between the ROAE and interest
rates, government ownership and bank concentration.
From the capital strength category of the profitability accounts we use the equity over
the total assets (EQAS) ratio. The impact of changes in this ratio on profitability
is ambiguous. The conventional risk-return hypothesis states that banks with high
equity to assets ratios are considered less risky compared to banks with lower equity
to asset ratios. More specifically, this hypothesis states that banks with lower capital
ratios gain higher returns and perform better than well-capitalized banks (Dietrich
and Wanzenried, 2011). Therefore, although a bank that retains a high proportion
of liquid assets is less exposed to risk, it is unlikely to earn high profits. On the
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one hand, lower levels of risk increase the bank’s credit value and confidence level
and consequently the cost of capital (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). On the other
hand, highly capitalized financial institutions are reliable, enjoying access to cheaper
resources (Berger, 1995a), and are able to retain their profitability even during eco-
nomically hard times. To date, existing empirical evidence suggests that the relation
of equity to assets ratio with profitability is positive (Bourke, 1989).
From the liquidity category of the profitability accounts, we select the following three
indicators: net loans over total assets (LIQUID); net loans over total deposits and
borrowings (NLTB); and net loans over customer deposits and short term funding
(NLDSF). Commercial banks set policies to manage their liquidity and their process
of managing assets and cash flow with the aim to maintain the ability to meet current
liabilities. The loans to assets ratio (LIQUID) captures the total loans outstanding as
a percentage of total assets. A high LIQUID ratio indicates that a bank is loaned up
and its liquidity is low. Without the required liquidity and funding to meet liabilities,
the financial institution may be incapable and fail. Also, the amount of operating
expenses to manage those loans might be higher than those required for investments.
In this case, a bank with a large proportion of loans in its financial statements would
present higher operating expenditures (Staikouras et al., 2008) leading to low profits.
However, the direction of this relationship is not certain. Liquid assets are considered
assets with low rates of return and therefore higher liquidity may negatively affect
profitability. Also, since loans are the most risky asset classes, one expects a high
LIQUID ratio to be associated with higher interest margins leading to higher profits
(Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008). Regarding the ratio of net loans to customers
and short term funding (NLDSF), this ratio compares illiquid assets (i.e. loans) with
stable funding resources (i.e. deposits and other short term funding). When the value
of this ratio is low, the bank liquidity is high. Since liquid assets are associated with
lower rates of return (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007), one expects the relationship
between NLDSF and the performance of the bank to be positive. Another ratio that
measures the level of liquidity is the ratio of net loans to deposits and borrowings
(NLTB). This ratio measures whether or not the bank efficiently covers its liabilities
by relying on its funds or not. The higher the NLTB ratio, the lower the liquidity of
the bank. If the ratio is too high, the bank may not have enough liquidity to cover any
unforeseen fund requirements. If the ratio is too low, the bank may not be earning
as much as it could be. On one hand, financial institutions often maintain liquid
assets that can be easily converted into cash in order to avoid distress situations. On
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Variables Description
Dependent variables
ROAA The return on average total assets of the bank (%)
NIM Net interest margin (in %), defined as net interest in-
come divided by total assets
Independent variables Expected effect
LOSSPROV A measure of asset quality. It shows how much a bank
is provisioning in year t relative to its income.
-
EQAS A measure of capital adequacy calculated as equity to
total assets. When the ratio is high this indicates low
leverage and therefore lower risk
+
ROAE Net profits over average total shareholder’s equity (%).
Measures a company’s performance over a fiscal year
and the return to shareholders on their investments.
+
CTI The cost to income ratio. It measures efficiency of the
management regarding expenses relative to the income
generated. The higher the ratio the less is the manage-
ment efficiency of the bank
-
NLDSF The loans to deposit ratio is a measure of liquidity. High
figures denotes lower liquidity. This loans to deposit
ratio is a measure of liquidity in as much as high figures
denotes lower liquidity.
+
LIQUID Net loans to total assets is a measure of liquidity. In-
dicates what percentage of the assets of the bank are
tied up in loans. The higher this ratio the less liquid the
bank will be.
+/-
LLGR Another measure of credit quality. This ratio indicated
how much of the total portfolio has been provided for
but not charged off. It is a reserve for losses expressed
as percentage of total loans
-
NLTB Net Loans to total deposits and borrowings. +/-
SIZE The accounting value of the bank’s total assets (in Euro) +
INF The annual percentage of inflation. +/-
GDP Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices
based on constant local currency.
+/-
CtA Bank capital to assets is the ratio of bank capital and
reserves to total assets.
+
LRA Ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets is the ra-
tio of domestic currency holdings and deposits with the
monetary authorities to claims on other governments,
nonfinancial public enterprises, the private sector, and
other banking institutions.
+
StGDP Stocks traded refers to the total value of shares traded
during the period. This indicator complements the mar-
ket capitalization ratio by showing whether market size
is matched by trading.
+/-
Note: Dependent variables measure bank profitability
Table 2.1: Definition of variables.
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the other hand, liquid assets are related to lower rates of return leading to higher
liquidity but lower profitability (Kosmidou, Pasiouras, and Tsaklanganos, 2007). In
their studies, Molyneux and Thornton (1992) found this weak negative relationship,
while Bourke (1989) found a positive relationship.
Finally, another independent determinant of profitability that is very often discussed
in the literature is SIZE. This factor is used to measure the impact of bank size
on performance, and is expressed as the total assets of the bank. Essentially, this
indicator accounts for size related economies or diseconomies of scale. In their study,
Kosmidou, Pasiouras, and Tsaklanganos (2007) argue that a large bank may enjoy
economies of scale that lower the expense of gathering and processing information, or
economies of scope that lead to loan and product diversification and provide access
to markets that smaller banks cannot enter.
2.2.2 External determinants
Turning to the external determinants, we consider that bank performance is influ-
enced from the country’s economy, the political environment and the financial struc-
ture in which the bank operates. From this category we draw five variables: the
growth of the gross domestic product (GDP), the inflation rate (INF), the bank
capital to assets ratio (CtA), bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio (LRA) and
the stocks traded to the total value of shares traded during this period (StGDP).
GDP growth is the most common macroeconomic indicator, it measures the total
economic activity of an economy, and is expected to have a positive impact on bank’s
performance in a mature environment (Staikouras and Wood, 2004). As for inflation,
its association with bank performance depends on whether is anticipated or not.
When the inflation is anticipated banks can timely adjust interest rates, which leads
to revenues that grow faster than expenses, with a positive impact on profitability.
When inflation is unanticipated banks may be laggard in adapting their interest rates
leading to a faster grow of bank expenses than revenues. This will have a negative
influence on bank profitability (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). Moreover, another
performance factor that may influence profitability is the bank capital to assets ra-
tio (CtA). This determinant measures the capital adequacy of a country according
to Basel accords. It includes Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital funds, which is a common
feature in all countries banking systems. We expect a positive relation between bank
capital to assets ratio and return on average assets. We also use the bank liquid
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reserves to bank assets ratio (LRA) (again as a percentage) which includes domestic
currency holdings and deposits. The benefit of reserves is that lets countries to an-
ticipate smoothly any domestic anomaly during crises (Jeanne and Rancie`re, 2006).
As we noted earlier, market economies maintain reserves to self-insure against cap-
ital flow volatilities and illiquidity. Furthermore, Jeanne and Rancie`re (2006) state
that the optimal level of a small country’s international reserves increases with the
amount of short-term debt the country has, potentially leading to instantaneous fail-
ure. Thus, as the “expected bankruptcy cost hypothesis” states we expect liquid
assets to present a non-linear relationship to bank profitability in which higher liquid
assets would improve a bank’s profitability as long as the marginal benefit of holding
additional liquid assets outmatches the opportunity cost of their low relative return.
Finally, we use as a determinant the total value of stock traded as percentage of GDP,
a supplementary of the market capitalization ratio, which measures the total value
of stocks traded during a period and the overall progress in the banking sector.
Chapter 3
Data and methodology
This section determines the sources of our data, gives an overview of the data itself
and describes the applied regression model.
3.1 Data
Our sample is an unbalance panel dataset of 1324 commercial banks, listed and
unlisted, operating in 26 countries of Western - Eastern Europe over the period 2005-
2012 consisting of 5502 observations. Overall, the number of observations amounts to
5502. We obtained all financial data of bank level were obtained from the Bankscope1
Database of the Bureau van Dijk’s company. Given that our interest lies only on
commercial banks in Eastern and Western Europe we excluded from our sample all
other types of banks, including cooperative banks, securities houses and investment
banks. The selection of variables that we derived from this database is as described
in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2.
Additional variables capturing country-specific and market-specific factors were drawn
from the World Economic Outlook of IMF and the World Bank database. This set
of variables includes GDP growth, inflation rate, bank capital to assets ratio, bank
liquid reserves to bank assets ratio and stocks traded, total value (as percentage of
GDP).
To examine the impact of the recent financial crisis, we separate our sample into two
equal time periods; specifically, into the interval from 2005 to 2008, which we take
as the pre-crisis period, and the interval from 2009 to 2012, which we take as the
post-crisis period.
1Bankscope has information for 11.000 banks and the accounting information at bank level is
presented in standardized format
15
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Country Number of Banks Country Number of Banks
Germany 26 Iceland 5
France 62 Luxembourg 19
Spain 27 Czech Republic 13
Italy 88 Hungary 8
Denmark 34 Croatia 27
Finland 6 Ukraine 17
Sweden 12 Slovenia 14
Belgium 8 Slovakia 12
Austria 12 Estonia 6
Russia 809 Lithuania 9
Ireland 11 Bulgaria 14
Greece 10 Latvia 21
Turkey 26 Serbia 28
Table 3.1: Total number of banks in sample by country.
We describe our data in 3.1 and 3.2. Table 3.12 lists the countries included in our
sample and the respective number of banks, while Table 3.2 provides descriptive
statistics for both the bank specific and the macroeconomic variables used in our
analysis. We highlight briefly a few interesting patterns. For example, over the entire
period from 2005 to 2012, the loan loss provision relative to net interest income has
a plausible mean value of 21.6%, but a significant variation of the order of 57.9%.
Similarly, the cost to income ratio, is on average 69.8% and its variation amounts to
29.8%; the variation of NLDSF and NLTB exceeds 38.2% in both cases; and average
bank capitalization (EQAS) is 16.0% while its variation amounts to 13.3%. Lastly,
the ROAE has a mean of 7.5% and a standard deviation of 26.1%, again a rather
high number.
From the category of the macroeconomic variables, it is worth mentioning the de-
terminant of total value of shares traded during the period (as percentage of GDP)
(StGDP), which has a standard deviation high as 30.8%. The other two macroeco-
nomic external determinants used in our model, bank capital to assets (CtA) and
bank liquid reserves to bank assets (LRA), also show high variability. On average
CtA amounts to 10.6% and LRA to 10.3%, with a standard deviation of 3,6% and
7.3% respectively.
2The country sample in Western and Eastern Europe includes 21 members of the EU. It also
includes the Russian Federation, Turkey, Iceland, Ukraine and Serbia which are not members of the
EU
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Dependent variables mean Std. dev skewness kurtosis min max
ROAA 1.178 2.600 -4.062 126.999 -65.140 30.990
NIM 5.313 3.605 1.849 13.089 -3.210 53.780
Independent variable mean Std. dev skewness kurtosis min max
LOSSPROV 21.562 57.865 3.284 84.504 -914.290 947.150
EQAS 16.024 13.267 2.383 10.094 -3.930 98.520
ROAE 7.511 26.087 -16.739 509.697 -992.290 187.740
CTI 69.771 29.797 6.515 107.942 0.000 731.880
NLDSF 100.786 70.165 3.905 31.457 0.000 991.390
LIQUID 56.089 19.841 -0.652 3.026 0.000 99.860
LLGR 5.919 7.239 4.223 34.873 0.000 100.000
NLTB 75.330 38.149 4.333 52.485 0.000 769.680
SIZE 22.654 125.002 10.426 137.776 0.000 2202.423
INF 7.439 4.308 -0.132 2.298 -4.480 25.232
GDP 2.755 5.949 -0.586 2.899 -17.955 25.232
CtA 10.641 3.578 -0.707 4.984 -14.072 23.600
LRA 10.324 7.318 2.528 17.455 0.239 72.024
StGDP 43.804 30.794 1.270 7.317 0.023 238.343
Obs 5502
For notation of the variables used see table 2.1 Note: SIZE (Total assets) in thousands e
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics over the entire period.
We attribute the high levels of variability in our data to two main reasons: (i) to
the fact that banks in (the relatively volatile) Eastern European countries comprise
a large share of our sample, and (ii) to the volatility caused by the financial crisis.
Correlation matrix between the variables is presented in Table 3.3. It can been seen
that there is fairly low correlation among the variables, except between bank capital
to assets ratio (CtA) and rate of inflation (INF).
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Table 3.3: Correlation between the variables during the period 1995 - 2012
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3.2 Methodology
In order to investigate the effects of the internal and external determinants that
influence the profitability of banks in Western and Eastern Europe we estimate a
linear regression of the following form:
xit = bi + bmitYmit + bdjtYdit + eit (3.1)
eit = µi + uit (3.2)
Where i refers to an individual bank; t refers to a calendar year; j refers to the country
in which bank i operates; xit denotes the dependent variable (the observation of a bank
i in a particular year t) that measures profitability (measured by the return on average
assets (ROAA) and the net interest margin (NIM)); Ym represents bank specific
variables; and Yd represents the external factors (i.e. the market level variables) of
a bank. e is the disturbance term for which we assume an one-way error component
specification, with µi
3 capturing the unobservable bank-specific effect and uit the
remainder (normally distributed) disturbance. One can think of these bank-specific
effects as the unobservable financial or managerial skills of the banks’ executives.
As the first step, we run our model using data that cover the entire period from 2005
to 2012. As we already mentioned in section 3.1 above, we subsequently split up our
sample into two time periods, in order to examine the influence of the recent financial
crisis on the association of Ym and Yd with bank profitability.
We use the method of fixed effects (FE) assuming that something within the bank-
entity may influence or bias the outcome variables. By using FE, we remove the effect
of those time-invariant characteristics so that we can evaluate the predictors’ variables
net effect (Baltagi, 2008). It is also important to mention that the fixed effect model
assumes that these time-invariant characteristics cannot cause any change to the
individual, in our case the banks, because they are constant for each bank.
The decision to use fixed effects rather than a random effects model has been taken
after executing the Hausman test. The Hausman specification test compares a ran-
dom effect model to its fixed counterpart. If the null hypothesis that the individual
3The fixed parameter captures bank’s individual characteristics and is correlated with the inde-
pendent variables
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effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors is rejected, a fixed effect model is
favored over its random counterpart. We executed the test for both sub-periods4 (for
the results, see Figures A.7, A.11, A.12, A.8, A.9, A.10 in Appendix A). Because the
Chi-square statistic obtained by the Hausman test in both cases is larger than the
Chi-square critical values of x20.5,14=13,4 or x
2
0.005,14=31,8, we conclude that the fixed
effect model is the fitting method.
We have also applied the Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity (Baum,
2001) to test for the existence of heteroscedasticity in the residual variance. The
test has been executed separately for the pre and post-crisis period (for the results,
see Figures A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6 in Appendix A). The chi-square values
that we obtain is larger than the critical values x20.5,1324=1323,3, x
2
0.005,1324=1195,2,
x20.5,1205=1204,3, x
2
0.005,1205=1082,3, x
2
0.5,1214 = 1213,3, x
2
0.005,1214=1090,8, therefore we
reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity.
As a final exercise and given that we estimated our regression separately on the pre-
crisis and post-crisis samples, we next test whether the resulting estimated coefficients
statistically differ across the two periods. In essence, we investigate for structural
changes in our data in order to determine whether the independent variables have
different impacts on profitability before and after the crisis. To do this, we apply the
Chow test (Chow, 1960) or poolability test5 employing the stata routine developed
by Shehata (2012). Specifically, to apply the test on our data we define a dymmy
variable D0 which takes the value 0 for the pre-crisis period and 1 for the post-crisis
period. Then, we compute the cross product (DX) of our independent variables times
the dummy variable, and we re-estimate our regression on the full sample including
the interacted terms among the regressors. The estimated coefficients on this new set
of variables provide evidence on the structural break. Table 3.4 reports the results
that we obtain after running the test on both of the dependent variables.
4To decide whether fixed or random effect model is the appropriate test for the post-crisis period
with NIM as dependent variable, we used Sargan-Hansen statistic (Lee and Okui, 2012) applying
the stata module xtoverid (Schaffer and Stillman, 2006). The t-statistic we obtain is significant,
therefore we reject the null hypothesis that RE is consistent.
5The Chow test is sometimes referred to as the poolability test because it examines if the data
are poolable so that the slopes of regressors are the same across individual entities or time peri-
ods(Baltagi, 2008).The test assumes that individual error variance components follow the normal
distribution, µ ∼ N (0, s2InT )
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Dependent variables: ROAA NIM
LOSSPROV -0.00178∗(0.023) -0.00255∗∗(0.002)
EQAS 0.07183∗∗∗(0.000) 0.07915∗∗∗(0.000)
ROAE 0.10164∗∗∗(0.000) 0.00492∗∗(0.002)
CTI -0.01431∗∗∗(0.000) -0.00903∗∗∗(0.000)
NLDSF 0.00021(0.718) 0.00201∗(0.048)
LIQUID 0.00901∗∗∗(0.000) 0.01098∗(0.039)
LLGR 0.01454∗∗(0.003) 0.08501∗∗∗(0.000)
NLTB -0.00837∗∗∗(0.000) 0.00649(0.178)
SIZE 0.00016(0.545) -0.00068∗(0.015)
INF 0.01086(0.378) 0.22584∗∗∗(0.000)
GDP -0.02125(0.073) 0.00062(0.944)
CtA 0.03373∗(0.042) 0.06642∗∗∗(0.000)
LRA -0.00077(0.878) 0.01737∗∗(0.006)
StGDP -0.00033(0.730) 0.00128(0.294)
D0 1.38660∗∗∗(0.000) -1.76197∗∗(0.005)
Dx LOSSPROV -0.00412∗∗∗(0.000) -0.00063(0.683)
Dx EQAS -0.06067∗∗∗(0.000) -0.01248(0.210)
Dx ROAE -0.05378∗∗∗(0.000) 0.03752∗∗∗(0.000)
Dx CTI -0.00042(0.793) 0.01434∗∗∗(0.000)
Dx NLDSF -0.00068(0.456) -0.00676∗∗∗(0.000)
Dx LIQUID -0.01885∗∗∗(0.000) 0.05790∗∗∗(0.000)
Dx LLGR -0.05179∗∗∗(0.000) -0.02689∗(0.013)
Dx NLTB 0.01608∗∗∗(0.000) -0.00160(0.760)
Dx SIZE -0.00033(0.379) -15.80705∗∗∗(0.000)
Dx INF 0.02919(0.123) -0.04276(0.167)
Dx GDP 0.00034(0.980) -0.00660(0.616)
Dx CtA -0.01645(0.475) -0.06449(0.182)
Dx LRA -0.01245(0.177) 0.09053∗∗∗(0.000)
Dx StGDP 0.00240(0.238) 0.00692(0.074)
1st period obs 2358 2358
2nd period obs 1193 1193
Chow Test 43.36 43.73
Wald Test 610.21 615.34
LM test 549.29 553.45
Likelihood Ratio test 578.68 583.30
The test applied in Stata using the Choreg module
p value in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.4: Chow test results for both dependent variables.
When the null hypothesis of poolability is rejected, our independent variables have
different slopes across periods, indicating the presence of a structural break (the full
set of results is given in Tables A.11 - A.12 in Appendix A).
Chapter 4
Empirical results
This section describes the results after the execution of the model and analyses the
effects of our internal and external factors on bank profitability.
4.1 Empirical results for Return on Average Assets
Table 4.1 presents the estimated parameters and corresponding t-statistics after the
model execution on our first measure of profitability (ROAA). The first column
presents the results for the pre-crisis period (2005-2008) while the second column
presents the results for the post-crisis period (2009-2012). The third column presents
the entire period. The explanatory power of the model is highest for the period
after the financial crisis (the adjusted R2 is equal to 0.23 for the post-crisis period
compared to 0.16 and 0.37 for the pre-crisis and the entire period respectively).
As Table 4.1 shows, in the pre-crisis period seven of the included determinants are
statistically significant, while in the post-crisis period only five of the determinants are
significant. Capital adequacy, operations and asset quality are the determinants with
highly significant coefficients in both periods. The equity to assets ratio, does not have
a significant effect on the banks profits after the crisis but, in pre-crisis period, it is
significant and positively related to ROAA. This result is consistent with findings from
previous studies by Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007), Berger (1995b), Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Huizinga (1999), Staikouras and Wood (2004), Goddard et al. (2004), Kosmidou
et al. (2006) and reflects either that well capitalized financial institutions counter
lower costs of going bankrupt by decreasing, their funding expenses or that they have
reduced needs for external funding (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). This result may
also reflect that, before crisis, the high total earnings of the financial institutions
were attached to attractive investments, thus leading to higher profitability. The
application of the Chow test confirms the existence of a structural break in this
22
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specific effect, with the coefficient of the corresponding cross product variable being
statistically significant at 0.1% significance level.
Dependent variable: ROAA Pre-crisis Post-crisis All years
LOSSPROV 0.00013(0.17) -0.00599∗∗∗(-7.82) -0.00427∗∗∗(-8.26)
EQAS 0.04096∗∗∗(8.76) 0.01410(0.65) 0.02448∗∗∗(5.39)
ROAE 0.08735∗∗∗(33.07) 0.04215∗∗∗(29.89) 0.05008∗∗∗(46.32)
CTI -0.00614∗∗∗(-3.83) -0.00593∗∗(-2.77) -0.01475∗∗∗(-12.66)
NLDSF -0.00027(-0.32) 0.00199(0.72) -0.00004(-0.05)
LIQUID 0.01647∗∗∗(4.73) 0.01341(0.99) 0.00982∗∗(2.91)
LLGR -0.01201(-1.58) -0.13047∗∗∗(-6.25) -0.03216∗∗∗(-5.53)
NLTB -0.00660∗∗∗(-3.84) -0.02204∗(-2.39) -0.00382∗(-2.33)
SIZE 0.00337∗∗(3.21) -0.00034(-0.13) 0.00150(1.39)
INF 0.00842(0.59) -0.03225(-1.26) -0.01206(-1.09)
GDP -0.00778(-0.70) -0.00091(-0.09) 0.01210∗∗(2.84)
CtA 0.08644∗∗∗(3.46) 0.05094 (1.41) 0.05578∗(2.56)
LRA 0.00701(0.82) -0.00490(-0.25) 0.01955∗(2.28)
StGDP -0.00040(-0.27) -0.00939(-1.22) -0.00118(-0.89)
Observations 3320 2182 5502
Number of Banks 1205 1214 1324
R2 0.4654 0.6636 0.5502
adj. R2 0.1554 0.2310 0.3658
F-stats 130.62 134.42 322.13
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.1: Regression results for Return on Average Assets (ROAA) as dependent
variable.
The return on average equity (ROAE), as the most common predictor of profitability,
has a positive and highly significant coefficient in both the sub-periods. As the return
on assets is a component of the return on equity(based on the DuPont Model), both
of which can be used to estimate a bank’s growth rate and profitability, this positive
relation comes as no surprise. The significant and positive coefficient shows that, in
both periods, banks retained their profitability.
The coefficient of the cost to income (CTI) is negative in both the pre-crisis and
the post-crisis period, indicating that an increase (decrease) in expenses decreases
(increases) the profits of commercial banks operating in Western and Eastern Eu-
rope to a large degree. The studies by Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011), Kosmidou
et al. (2007), Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) amongst others, also investigated this
relationship and found the same result; i.e, that poor cost management leads to
poor profitability. The fact that the coefficient of the cost to income ratio is signifi-
cant and negative in both sub-periods suggests that practice of insufficient expense
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management, which was common before the crisis, persisted through the post-crisis
period.
From the determinants in the asset quality category, two yield interesting results.
First, the loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio (LLGR) is negatively and signifi-
cantly related to the return on average assets only in the post-crisis periods. This
result is according to expectations because, on the one hand, loan loss reserves are
a cumulative repository that changes by the amount of new loan provisions added
each year and, on the other hand, the numerator of ROAA, which is net profits after
tax or net income, results after the subtraction of provisions (along with the taxes
and extraordinary items) from the operating profit before provisions, taxes and ex-
traordinary items. During favorable economic conditions when net income and credit
quality are high, banks may reduce the fluctuation of income by providing higher pro-
visions than required. However, when economic conditions are difficult, like during
the recent financial crisis, provisions need not increase since credit quality and net
income fall (Kosmidou, 2008). Second, the loan loss provisions to net interest revenue
ratio (LOSSPROV) is statistically significant and negatively related to our depen-
dent variable also only during the post-crisis period. This indicates the bad quality
of assets that banks in Western and Eastern Europe hold after the time of turmoil.
The execution of the Chow test confirms these results, indicating a structural break
in the association of ROAA with both determinants of the asset quality category.
The coefficients on the corresponding interaction terms are statistically significant at
the 0.1% significance level.
Turning to determinants related to bank liquidity, the results show a positive and
highly significant relation between loans to total assets (LIQUID) and the return
on average assets (ROAA) again in the pre-crisis period. Since loans are riskier and
contribute on profits with greater expected returns than other bank assets (Staikouras
and Wood, 2004), one can interpret the positive and significant coefficient on LIQUID
to reflect that, before the crisis, the banks in our sample were issuing loans with
high expected return. A second indicator of bank liquidity which we find to predict
profitability is the net loans to total deposits and borrowings (NLTB) ratio. The
results suggests that this ratio is negatively and significantly related to the return
on average assets (ROAA) in both periods, but this relationship is stronger after
the crisis (the post-crisis coefficient is more than three times the value of the pre-
crisis coefficient). An explanation of this result is that banks of Western and Eastern
Europe lack private fund resources and count mainly on external resources in order
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to cover their liabilities, especially so after the crisis. Again, both aforementioned
results find support in the Chow test results. The coefficients on the interaction
terms of the LIQUID and NLTB variables with the pre-crisis dummy are statistically
significant at 0.1% significance level.
As for bank size (SIZE), we find that during the pre-crisis period this determinant
is significantly and positively related to the return on average assets (ROAA). This
finding suggest that before crisis the commercial banks of Western and Eastern Eu-
rope were able to benefit from higher product and loan diversification activities and
economies of scale, which increased their profitability.
Finally, among the included macroeconomic determinants, only one - the bank capital
to asset ratio - has significant association with ROAA. Specifically, we find that this
ratio is highly significant and positively related to ROAA before the financial crash.
This finding suggests that, in that period, banks may have been motivated by the
adequacy of supportive capital funds in the national accounts to invest in riskier,
high margin investments, thus increasing their profits.
4.2 Empirical results for Net Interest Margin
Table 4.2 presents the estimated parameters and t-statistics after our model execution
on our second measure of profitability - the net interest margin (NIM). This Table
is structured the same way as Table 4.1. The first column represents the results
for the pre-crisis period (2005-2008); the second column presents the results for the
post-crisis period (2009-2012); and the third column presents the results for the
two periods combined. As our good-of-fit measures suggest, switching from using
ROAA to using NIM as the dependent variable generally worsens the performance
of our model. Specifically, the resulting R-squared indicator is lower in all periods,
and the adjusted R-squared becomes negative (adjusted R2 is equal to -0.72 in the
post-crisis period compared to -0.36 and -0.09 in the pre-crisis and the entire period,
respectively). These results create concern for the validity of the regression estimates.
Therefore, although we next discuss these estimates, we do so with reservation.
During the pre-crisis period the equity to assets ratio, has a highly significant and
positive effect on the banks’ profits. This result is consistent with our expectation.
Banks took advantage of the market conditions and invest their free capital in loans
with beneficial return/risk profile assets, increasing their interest margins (Claeys
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Dependent variable: NIM Pre-crisis Post-crisis All years
LOSSPROV -0.00125(-1.09) -0.00042(-1.15) -0.00148∗∗(-2.58)
EQAS 0.05978∗∗∗(8.49) 0.04911∗∗∗(4.75) 0.06595∗∗∗(13.14)
ROAE 0.01587∗∗∗(3.99) -0.00008(-0.11) 0.00423∗∗∗(3.54)
CTI -0.00223(-0.92) -0.00687∗∗∗(-6.71) -0.00535∗∗∗(-4.15)
NLDSF -0.00070(-0.54) 0.00140(1.07) -0.00143(-1.75)
LIQUID 0.05663∗∗∗(10.80) 0.02809∗∗∗(4.33) 0.06411∗∗∗(17.16)
LLGR 0.07308∗∗∗(6.39) 0.04447∗∗∗(4.46) 0.06789∗∗∗(10.57)
NLTB -0.01035∗∗∗(-3.99) 0.00224(0.51) -0.00520∗∗(-2.87)
SIZE -0.00101(0.64) 0.00050(0.39) 0.00037(0.31)
INF 0.09353∗∗∗(4.36) 0.03190∗∗(2.60) 0.11434∗∗∗(9.36)
GDP -0.00009(-0.01) -0.04438∗∗∗(-8.87) -0.00475(-1.01)
CtA 0.01037(0.28) 0.03621∗(2.10) -0.00583(-0.24)
LRA 0.01199(0.93) 0.02869∗∗(3.12) 0.03382∗∗∗(3.56)
StGDP -0.00500∗(-2.25) 0.00120(0.33) -0.00210(-1.43)
Observations 3320 2182 5502
Number of Banks 1205 1214 1324
R2 0.1365 0.2182 0.1756
adj. R2 -0.3641 -0.7244 -0.0891
F-stats 23.72 22.20 63.35
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 4.2: Regression results for Net Interest Margin (NIM) as dependent variable.
and Vander Vennet, 2008). We also find a positive and significant coefficient in the
post-crisis period, suggesting that the banks retained discipline on depositors, which
decreased the deposits costs, leading to higher interest margins.
Among the determinants related to operations, the return on average equity (ROAE)
determinant has a positive and significant association with bank profitability in the
pre-crisis period, but no significant effect after the crisis. This positive result con-
firms our expectation that, before the crisis, Western and Eastern banks had funding
support from their shareholders, raised capital and invested it efficiently, increasing
their profitability. Our second operational efficiency measure, the cost to income ra-
tio (CTI), has a negative and a highly significant coefficient in the post-crisis period.
This finding suggest that, after the crisis, bank expenses increased and profits de-
clined. Indeed, the mean value of CTI during the post-crisis is higher compared to the
mean in pre-crisis period, showing that the management of expenses impaired after
the crisis. As we mentioned above, this relationship between poor cost management
and poor profitability is supported by previous research (e.g. Kosmidou et al. (2007),
Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011), Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007)). The application
of the Chow test confirms the existence of structural break, with the coefficients of
the corresponding cross product variables being significant at 0.1% significance level.
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Turning now to our measures of liquidity, the net loans to total assets ratio (LIQUID)
shows a highly significant and positive relation to the net interest margin (NIM) in
both periods. This indicates that banks lend in wide margins to compensate for the
risk taking both before and after the financial crash (Claeys and Vander Vennet,
2008). It also suggests that banks may use optimal risk management techniques and
maintain their liquidity levels low enough to realize profits. In contrast, the net loans
to total deposits and borrowings ratio (NLTB) determinant is negatively related to
the net interest margin and this association is statistically significant only in the
pre-crisis period. A low NLTB ratio, suggests that banks may not be earning an
optimal return, while a high NLTB ratio suggest that banks might not have enough
liquidity to cover any insolvency problems or economic crises. We, therefore, interpret
the negative and significant coefficient to reflect that, during pre-crisis period, banks
borrowed money which they reloaned at higher rates for better returns. However,
their liquidity decreased making them unable to handle the economic crash.
From the asset quality category of determinants, we find that the loan loss reserves
to gross loans determinant (LLGR) is positively and significantly related to the net
interest margin in both periods, but this relationship is stronger before the crisis (the
coefficient in the pre-crisis period is almost double that in the post-crisis period). In
theory, high margins may be associated with a low degree of efficiency. However,
high margins are also observed when an inadequate regulatory banking environment
and a high level of information asymmetry co-exist (Claeys and Vander Vennet,
2008), which has been the case in the pre-crisis period. Under such circumstances,
especially in less developed economies with risky environment (e.g. in south east
Europe), relatively high bank margins are essential, at least temporarily, to maintain
bank value and creditworthiness. In addition, banks can maintain a high interest
margin when they hold capital in excess of the regulatory minimum. In this case,
they can either invest in risky assets gaining higher interest margin, or they can
hold the capital (considered to be the most expensive form of liabilities in terms of
expected return) and therefore attain the creditworthiness of depositors. In a safe
environment, banks sustain enough free capital and they have the capacity to increase
their portfolio of risky assets in the form of securities and loans. Thus, they need to
reserve for loan losses, respectively. This scenario explains the positive and significant
relation of LLGR to net interest margin during the pre-crisis period. However, after
the financial crash, banks operate in more risky environments and lack the expertise
to control their lending operations. In order to compensate for this risk, banks need
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to maintain the same level of loan loss reserves because of the inability to release
the problematic loans and gain higher interest margins. As a result, the relation of
LLGR to NIM remains positive and significant. In line with the regression estimates,
the execution of the Chow test indicates a structural break. The coefficient of the
interaction term between NIM and the pre-crisis dummy is statistically significant at
5% significance level.
As for the external determinants related to the macroeconomic environment, our
study finds that all of them significantly influence net interest margin. To start with,
the annual rate of inflation (INF) has a positive and highly significant coefficient
in both periods. This positive coefficient supports the hypothesis that lower infla-
tion rates create downward effects in interest rates, leading to lower intermediate
margins and reversely. Second, the growth in gross domestic product has a positive
and insignificant coefficient during the pre-crisis period, but this coefficient becomes
negative and highly significant after the crisis. This result can be explained by the
increased volatility of the business cycle (especially in the eastern countries) which
commonly occurs when financial crises hit in periods of high economic growth. The
post-crisis coefficient, in particular, is consistent with prior evidence by Athanasoglou,
Delis, and Staikouras (2006) which suggests that the effect of GDP growth on bank
profitability may be negative when banks operate in unformed environments.
Third, the capital to assets ratio (CtA) is significant and positive related to net
interest margin (NIM) only in the post-crisis period. We attribute this result to the
fact that, in its attempt to address the crisis, the Central European bank provided
capital injections to financial institutions while maintaining the high interest rates
or decreasing interest rate expenses. Furthermore, after the economic crash, more
sharp regulations were established by the national governments aiming to correct
past uncongenial situations. These corrective actions guide financial institution to
more efficient capital management and, therefore to higher profitability.
Fourth, the ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets (LRA) has a coefficient which
is positive and insignificant before the crisis, but turns to positive and significant after
the crisis. The LRA ratio indicates the domestic currency holdings and deposits with
the monetary authorities to claims on other institutions. Thus, its positive post-crisis
coefficient may reflect the new liquidity requirements that were adopted after the
crisis (including some sharper standards than those set by the Basel II International
regulatory accord), aimed at helping banks (Ho, 2002) withstand a new credit crunch.
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In the long-term, these new standards improved banks’ profitability. The application
of the Chow test on this specific variable confirms the existence of structural break.
The coefficient of the corresponding cross product variable is statistically significant
at the 0.1% significance level.
Finally, the ratio of stocks traded to growth domestic product is significant and
negatively related to the net interest margin only in the pre-crisis period. This result
runs contrary to expectations. One would normally expect a positive coefficient given
that a larger stock market enables banks to gain higher interest margins. A potential
explanation of this negative relation may be that a larger stock market in relation
to the banking sector creates opportunities of substitution between debt and equity,
thus decreasing bank margins (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999).
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This study has examined how bank-specific characteristics and macroeconomic factor
affect the profitability of commercial banks in Western and Eastern Europe over
the period from 2005 to 2012. To measure profitability, we used two alternative
indicators; namely, the return on average assets and the net interest margin. To
explore the impacts of the recent economic crisis, we separated our period of study
in two sub-periods. We compared the years before the crisis, namely the period from
2005 to 2008, with the years after the crisis, i.e, the interval from 2009 to 2012. Until
today, no econometric study has examined the determinants of profitability in both
Western and Eastern Europe during the recent financial crisis.
We used a fixed effect model (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007) to purge from our
measures of profitability any influence of time-invariant bank characteristics. The
results indicate that the profitability of commercial banks in Western and Eastern
Europe is influenced by changes in both internal characteristics and in the overall
macroeconomic environment. In particular, when we measure bank profitability by
the return on average assets, we find that it is mainly explained by capital adequacy,
the quality of loans and expenses at the bank level, and by GDP growth at macroeco-
nomic level. Similarly, when we measure profitability by the net interest margins, we
find that it is explained by capital adequacy, operational efficiency and credit quality
at the bank level, and by the rate of inflation at the macro level. Finally, when we
separate the sample in the periods before and after the financial crisis, we find that
the crisis had a significant impact on the relationship between profitability and its
determinants. During the pre-crisis period, the return on average assets increased as
a result of efficient management of the banks’ capital structure, sufficient liquidity
and confidence in the banking system due to capital adequacy in funds in the na-
tional accounts. During the post-crisis period, however, these favourable factors were
replaced by a number of negative influences that pushed profitability in the opposite
direction. Specifically, after the crisis, the return on average assets decreased due to
30
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bad asset quality and strict credit risk measures that raised the amount of loan loss
reserves. As for the net interest margin, this was also driven by different determi-
nants across the two periods. Before the crisis, the net interest margin, increased
with the return on equity and decreased with the loans to deposits and borrowings.
However, after the crisis, it decreased as cost management and GDP growth improved
- a result tha challenges the commonly accepted view that economic growth always
benefits the banking industry (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2003;Dietrich and Wanzenried,
2011;Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999;Athanasoglou et al., 2008).
A number of limitations of our study may cause concern. First, the set of deter-
minants that we included in the regression analysis is somewhat narrow and could
be enriched with other potentially relevant explanatory variables. The fact that our
set of regressors is lacking is reflected in the goodness-of-fit of our models, which in
some cases is alarmingly low. Second, the way we divided the sample in the two
sub-periods is not fully accurate and could be refined (e.g. the year 2008, which is
when the crisis hit, is taken to be a pre-crisis year). Third, we do not take full ad-
vantage of the country variation in our data to explore differences between Western
and Eastern banks. To partly address this concern, we tested whether our results are
sensitive to excluding Russian banks from the sample. Even though our dataset con-
tains a large number of banks from the Russian Federation, we find that the results
are qualitatively robust to their exclusion (results available upon request).
To overcome these limitations, future research could incorporate other specific char-
acteristics of bank management in the set of potential predictors, e.g. managerial
skills, experience, and education, all of which are considered important factors in
explaining bank profitability. In addition, a possible area for future research could
analyse the determinants of bank profitability in the West European region in com-
parison to the Eastern European banks and try alternative definitions of the pre and
post-crisis periods. It may be interesting to separate the sample in three instead of
two sub-periods; i.e. the periods before, during, and after the crisis.
Appendix A
Appendix
Figure A.1: Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 2005-2012 (ROAA as
dependent variable)
Figure A.2: Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 2005-2008 (ROAA as
dependent variable)
Figure A.3: Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 2009-2012 (ROAA as
dependent variable)
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Figure A.4: Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 2005-2012 (NIM as
dependent variable)
Figure A.5: Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 2005-2008 (NIM as
dependent variable)
Figure A.6: Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 2009-2012 (NIM as
dependent variable)
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Table A.1: Correlation table (2005-2008)
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Table A.2: Correlation table (2009-2012)
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Dependent variables mean Std. dev skewness kurtosis min max
ROAA 1.650 2.079 4.672 51.123 -12.660 30.990
NIM 5.680 3.728 2.157 16.333 -1.130 53.780
Independent variable mean Std. dev skewness kurtosis min max
LOSSPROV 16.973 40.632 1.410 110.325 -704.950 764.640
EQAS 16.457 13.541 2.328 9.655 -0.470 98.520
ROAE 11.612 12.265 -1.545 32.578 -178.940 107.880
CTI 65.315 23.327 4.430 58.244 0.000 449.150
NLDSF 101.968 69.714 4.134 36.714 0.000 991.390
LIQUID 56.302 19.757 -0.671 3.025 0.000 99.860
LLGR 4.966 6.702 5.234 50.147 0.000 100.000
NLTB 76.495 39.993 4.606 55.593 0.000 769.680
TA 19.535 115.052 10.747 148.237 0.000 2202.423
INF 8.191 3.912 -0.115 3.190 0.453 25.232
GDP 6.037 3.428 -0.182 6.533 -4.244 25.232
CtA 10.758 3.406 -0.616 3.839 -4.151 23.600
LRA 11.250 7.734 2.907 19.590 0.239 72.024
StGDP 46.923 33.720 1.508 7.249 0.023 238.343
Obs 3320
For notation of the variables used see table 2.1 Note: SIZE (Total assets) in thousands e
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics over the period 2005-2008.
Dependent variables mean Std. dev skewness kurtosis min max
ROAA 0.458 3.102 -7.786 133.598 -65.140 18.330
NIM 4.756 3.334 1.185 4.758 -3.210 24.980
Independent variable mean Std. dev skewness kurtosis min max
LOSSPROV 28.545 76.499 3.066 55.328 -914.290 947.150
EQAS 15.364 12.813 2.472 10.853 -3.930 95.590
ROAE 1.270 37.723 -13.438 284.521 -992.290 187.740
CTI 76.552 36.540 6.826 101.233 1.870 731.880
NLDSF 98.986 70.824 3.580 23.949 0.610 819.530
LIQUID 55.764 19.967 -0.622 3.029 0.060 98.940
LLGR 7.369 7.768 3.359 23.758 0.000 98.850
NLTB 73.557 35.093 3.622 41.525 0.080 589.570
TA 27.399 138.673 9.892 122.074 0.001 2164.103
INF 6.294 4.621 0.056 1.465 -4.480 15.895
GDP -2.239 5.481 0.270 2.630 -17.955 15.895
CtA 10.463 3.819 -0.773 5.910 -14.072 21.000
LRA 8.917 6.383 1.432 7.922 0.424 39.917
StGDP 39.059 24.981 -0.105 2.617 0.076 109.843
Obs 2182
For notation of the variables used see table 2.1 Note: SIZE (Total assets) in thousands e
Table A.4: Descriptive statistics over the period 2009-2012.
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(Fixed effect) (Random effect)
ROAA ROAA
LOSSPROV -0.00427∗∗∗ (-8.26) -0.00431∗∗∗ (-9.23)
EQAS 0.02448∗∗∗ (5.39) 0.04016∗∗∗ (12.28)
ROAE 0.05008∗∗∗ (46.32) 0.05350∗∗∗ (52.24)
CTI -0.01475∗∗∗ (-12.66) -0.01752∗∗∗ (-18.85)
NLDSF -0.00004 (-0.05) 0.00038 (0.71)
LIQUID 0.00982∗∗ (2.91) 0.00291 (1.28)
LLGR -0.03216∗∗∗ (-5.53) -0.00859∗ (-2.13)
NLTB -0.00382∗ (-2.33) -0.00280∗ (-2.11)
TA 0.00150 (1.39) 0.00009 (0.27)
INF -0.01206 (-1.09) 0.01402 (1.65)
GDP 0.01210∗∗ (2.84) 0.01789∗∗∗ (4.57)
CtA 0.05578∗ (2.56) 0.04333∗∗∗ (3.47)
LRA 0.01955∗ (2.28) 0.00421 (0.82)
StGDP -0.00118 (-0.89) 0.00094 (0.95)
cons 0.74085∗ (2.18) 0.82592∗∗∗ (4.78)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.5: Hausman Specification Test - ROAA
Figure A.7: Hausman Test - ROAA
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(Fixed effect) (Random effect)
NIM NIM
LOSSPROV -0.00148∗∗ (-2.58) -0.00136∗ (-2.47)
EQAS 0.06595∗∗∗ (13.14) 0.07974∗∗∗ (18.50)
ROAE 0.00423∗∗∗ (3.54) 0.00445∗∗∗ (3.77)
CTI -0.00535∗∗∗ (-4.15) -0.00531∗∗∗ (-4.58)
NLDSF -0.00143 (-1.75) -0.00085 (-1.20)
LIQUID 0.06411∗∗∗ (17.16) 0.05376∗∗∗ (17.39)
LLGR 0.06789∗∗∗ (10.57) 0.06103∗∗∗ (11.31)
NLTB -0.00520∗∗ (-2.87) -0.00411∗ (-2.48)
TA 0.00037 (0.31) -0.00036 (-0.63)
INF 0.11434∗∗∗ (9.36) 0.18526∗∗∗ (17.54)
GDP -0.00475 (-1.01) 0.00457 (1.01)
CtA -0.00583 (-0.24) 0.13473∗∗∗ (7.96)
LRA 0.03382∗∗∗ (3.56) 0.03931∗∗∗ (5.42)
StGDP -0.00210 (-1.43) 0.00177 (1.37)
cons 0.12686 (0.34) -1.80858∗∗∗ (-6.98)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.6: Hausman Specification Test - NIM
Figure A.8: Hausman Test - NIM
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(Fixed effect) (Random effect)
NIM NIM
LOSSPROV -0.00125 (-1.09) -0.00119 (-1.17)
EQAS 0.05978∗∗∗ (8.49) 0.07965∗∗∗ (13.92)
ROAE 0.01587∗∗∗ (3.99) 0.02068∗∗∗ (5.60)
CTI -0.00223 (-0.92) 0.00043 (0.21)
NLDSF -0.00070 (-0.54) 0.00013 (0.13)
LIQUID 0.05663∗∗∗ (10.80) 0.05045∗∗∗ (12.68)
LLGR 0.07308∗∗∗ (6.39) 0.06277∗∗∗ (7.36)
NLTB -0.01035∗∗∗ (-3.99) -0.00816∗∗∗ (-3.78)
TA 0.00101 (0.64) -0.00054 (-0.77)
INF 0.09353∗∗∗ (4.36) 0.18787∗∗∗ (11.08)
GDP -0.00009 (-0.01) 0.01332 (0.88)
CtA 0.01037 (0.28) 0.15741∗∗∗ (6.31)
LRA 0.01199 (0.93) 0.03312∗∗∗ (3.69)
StGDP -0.00500∗ (-2.25) 0.00083 (0.46)
cons 1.19267 (1.86) -2.13235∗∗∗ (-5.82)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.7: Hausman Specification Test - NIM pre-crisis
Figure A.9: Hausman Test - NIM pre-crisis
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(Fixed effect) (Random effect)
NIM NIM
LOSSPROV -0.00042 (-1.15) -0.00074∗ (-2.00)
EQAS 0.04911∗∗∗ (4.75) 0.09006∗∗∗ (14.82)
ROAE -0.00008 (-0.11) 0.00020 (0.29)
CTI -0.00687∗∗∗ (-6.71) -0.00640∗∗∗ (-6.75)
NLDSF 0.00140 (1.07) -0.00008 (-0.09)
LIQUID 0.02809∗∗∗ (4.33) 0.03493∗∗∗ (8.15)
LLGR 0.04447∗∗∗ (4.46) 0.05698∗∗∗ (8.59)
NLTB 0.00224 (0.51) 0.00101 (0.37)
TA 0.00050 (0.39) -0.00059 (-1.01)
INF 0.03190∗∗ (2.60) 0.08068∗∗∗ (7.10)
GDP -0.04438∗∗∗ (-8.87) -0.05451∗∗∗ (-11.04)
CtA 0.03621∗ (2.10) 0.10527∗∗∗ (6.98)
LRA 0.02869∗∗ (3.12) 0.04378∗∗∗ (5.23)
StGDP 0.00120 (0.33) 0.01089∗∗∗ (4.04)
cons 1.34722∗∗∗ (3.50) -0.94373∗∗ (-3.24)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.8: Hausman Specification Test - NIM post-crisis
Figure A.10: Sargan Hansen Test - NIM post-crisis
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(Fixed effect) (Random effect)
ROAA ROAA
LOSSPROV 0.00013 (0.17) -0.00047 (-0.75)
EQAS 0.04096∗∗∗ (8.76) 0.06386∗∗∗ (19.45)
ROAE 0.08735∗∗∗ (33.07) 0.09682∗∗∗ (42.47)
CTI -0.00614∗∗∗ (-3.83) -0.01012∗∗∗ (-8.14)
NLDSF -0.00027 (-0.32) -0.00014 (-0.26)
LIQUID 0.01647∗∗∗ (4.73) 0.01164∗∗∗ (5.25)
LLGR -0.01201 (-1.58) 0.01084∗ (2.31)
NLTB -0.00660∗∗∗ (-3.84) -0.00714∗∗∗ (-5.66)
TA 0.00337∗∗ (3.21) 0.00055 (1.64)
INF 0.00842 (0.59) 0.01440 (1.43)
GDP -0.00778 (-0.70) -0.01751 (-1.90)
CtA 0.08644∗∗∗ (3.46) 0.06049∗∗∗ (4.15)
LRA 0.00701 (0.82) -0.00103 (-0.20)
StGDP -0.00040 (-0.27) 0.00086 (0.84)
cons -1.05208∗ (-2.47) -0.69587∗∗∗ (-3.55)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.9: Hausman Specification Test - ROAA pre-crisis
Figure A.11: Hausman Test - ROAA pre-crisis
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(Fixed effect) (Random effect)
ROAA ROAA
LOSSPROV -0.00599∗∗∗ (-7.82) -0.00626∗∗∗ (-9.40)
EQAS 0.01410 (0.65) 0.00931 (1.43)
ROAE 0.04215∗∗∗ (29.89) 0.04675∗∗∗ (37.09)
CTI -0.00593∗∗ (-2.77) -0.01337∗∗∗ (-9.44)
NLDSF 0.00199 (0.72) -0.00025 (-0.25)
LIQUID 0.01341 (0.99) -0.01193∗∗ (-2.58)
LLGR -0.13047∗∗∗ (-6.25) -0.04100∗∗∗ (-5.72)
NLTB -0.02204∗ (-2.39) 0.00816∗∗ (2.80)
TA -0.00034 (-0.13) -0.00027 (-0.54)
INF -0.03225 (-1.26) 0.01160 (0.63)
GDP -0.00091 (-0.09) -0.01365 (-1.55)
CtA 0.05094 (1.41) 0.04372 (1.94)
LRA -0.00490 (-0.25) -0.01163 (-0.99)
StGDP -0.00939 (-1.22) 0.00295 (1.00)
cons 2.53831∗∗ (3.15) 1.32324∗∗∗ (4.24)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A.10: Hausman Specification Test - ROAA post-crisis
Figure A.12: Hausman Test - ROAA post-crisis
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Structural Change Tests: Y = X + D0 + DX
Ho: no Structural Change
N1: 1st Period Obs = 3320
N2: 2nd Period Obs = 2182
Chow Test [K, N-2*K]= 43.7296 P-Value >F(14,5474)0.0000
Fisher Test [N2,(N1-K)]=3.0523 P-Value >F(2182,3306)0.0000
Wald Test=615.3464 P-Value >Chi2(2182)0.0000
Likelihood Ratio Test=583.3042 P-Value >Chi2(2182)0.0000
Lagrange Multiplier Test=553.4485 P-Value >Chi2(2182)0.0000
F(16,5471)=79.71
Prob >F=0.0000
Table A.11: Chow Test results for ROAA.
Structural Change Tests: Y = X + D0 + DX
Ho: no Structural Change
N1: 1st Period Obs = 3320
N2: 2nd Period Obs = 2182
Chow Test [K, N-2*K]= 39.3637 P-Value >F(15,5472)0.0000
Fisher Test [N2,(N1-K)]= 3.0858 P-Value >F(2182,3305)0.0000
Wald Test=593.6931 P-Value >Chi2(2182)0.0000
Likelihood Ratio Test=563.7944 P-Value >Chi2(2182)0.0000
Lagrange Multiplier Test=535.8701 P-Value >Chi2(2182)0.0000
F(16,5471)=37.49
Prob >F=0.0000
Table A.12: Chow Test results for NIM.
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